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8 Attorneys for Plaintiff
9 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

10 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

11 FOR THE CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

12 SOUTHERN DIVISION

13 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

14 Plaintiff,

15 v.

16 MARGARET QUICK,

17 Defendant.

No. SA CR 18-000243-AG

STIPULATION REGARDING REQUEST FOR
(1) CONTINUANCE OF TRIAL DATE AND
(2) FINDINGS OF EXCLUDABLE TIME
PERIODS PURSUANT TO SPEEDY TRIAL
ACT

CURRENT TRIAL DATE: 05/21/2019
PROPOSED TRIAL DATE: 11/19/2019

19 Plaintiff United States of America, by and through its counsel
20 of record, the United States Attorney for the Central District of
21 California and Assistant United States Attorney Charles E. Pell, and
22 defendant MARGARET QUICK ("defendant"), both individually and by and
23 through her counsel of record, Evan J. Davis, Esquire, hereby
24 stipulate as follows:

25 1. The Indictment in this case was filed on November 28, 2018.
26 Defendant first appeared before a judicial officer of the court in
27 which the charges in this case were pending on March 25, 2019. The
28 Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161, originally required that the

1 trial commence on or before June 3, 2019.

2 2. On December 3, 2018, the case was transferred from the
3 Honorable James v. Selna to the Honorable Andrew J. Guilford.

4 3. On March 25, 2019, the Court set a trial date of May 21,
5 2019, and a status conference date of May 13, 2019.

6 4. Defendant is released on bond pending trial. The parties
7 estimate that the trial in this matter will last approximately five
8 days.

9 5. By this stipulation, defendant moves to continue the trial
10 date to November 19, 2019, and the status conference date to November
11 11, 2019. This is the first request for a continuance.

12 6. Defendant requests the continuance based upon the following
13 facts, which the parties believe demonstrate good cause to support
14 the appropriate findings under the Speedy Trial Act:

15 a. Defendant is charged with violating 26 U.S.C.
16 § 7212(a): attempt to interfere with administration of the Internal
17 Revenue laws (counts 1-2), and 18 U.S.C. § 1001(a)(2): false
18 statement (count 3).

19 b. The government has produced discovery to the defense,
20 including 125 pages of written reports. The volume of discovery in
21 progress of being formatted for production exceeds 1,700 GB, with
22 approximately 299,303 items, which includes additional reports,
23 digital documents such as email messages and tax records

24 c. Due to the nature of the prosecution and the existence
25 of novel questions of fact or law, including the charges in the
26 indictment and the voluminous discovery being produced to defendant,
27 this case is so unusual and so complex that it is unreasonable to
28 expect adequate preparation for pretrial proceedings or for the trial

1 itself within the Speedy Trial Act time limits. This case will also
2 involve issues involving the attorney-client privilege.

3 d. Defense counsel Toscher has a prepaid vacation from
4 September 5 to 28, 2019, and defense counsel Davis has a prepaid
5 vacation from August 2 to 16, 2019.

6 e. In light of the foregoing, counsel for defendant also
7 represents that additional time is necessary to confer with
8 defendant, conduct and complete an independent investigation of the
9 case, conduct and complete additional legal research including for
10 potential pre-trial motions, review the discovery and potential
11 evidence in the case, and prepare for trial in the event that a
12 pretrial resolution does not occur. Defense counsel represents that
13 failure to grant the continuance would deny him reasonable time
14 necessary for effective preparation, taking into account the exercise
15 of due diligence.

16 f. Defendant believes that failure to grant the
17 continuance will deny her continuity of counsel and adequate
18 representation.

19 g. The government joins in the request for, and does not
20 object to, the continuance.

21 h. The requested continuance is not based on congestion
22 of the Court's calendar, lack of diligent preparation on the part of
23 the attorney for the government or the defense, or failure on the
24 part of the attorney for the Government to obtain available
25 witnesses.

26 7. For purposes of computing the date under the Speedy Trial
27 Act by which defendant's trial must commence, the parties agree that
28 the time period of April 26, 2019, to November 19, 2019, inclusive,

1 should be excluded pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §§ 3161(h)(7)(A),
2 (h)(7)(B)(i), (h)(7)(B)(ii), and (h)(7)(B)(iv) because the delay
3 results from a continuance granted by the Court at defendant's
4 request, without government objection, on the basis of the Court's
5 finding that: (i) the ends of justice served by the continuance
6 outweigh the best interest of the public and defendant in a speedy
7 trial; (ii) failure to grant the continuance would be likely to make
8 a continuation of the proceeding impossible, or result in a
9 miscarriage of justice; (iii) the case is so unusual and so complex,
10 due to the nature of the prosecution and the existence of novel
11 questions of fact or law, that it is unreasonable to expect
12 preparation for pre-trial proceedings or for the trial itself within
13 the time limits established by the Speedy Trial Act; and (iv) failure
14 to grant the continuance would unreasonably deny defendant continuity
15 of counsel and would deny defense counsel the reasonable time
16 necessary for effective preparation, taking into account the exercise
17 of due diligence.

18 8. Nothing in this stipulation shall preclude a finding that
19 other provisions of the Speedy Trial Act dictate that additional time
20 periods be excluded from the period within which trial must commence.
21 Moreover, the same provisions and/or other provisions of the Speedy

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23 ///

24 ///

1 Trial Act may in the future authorize the exclusion of additional
2 time periods from the period within which trial must commence.


3 IT IS SO STIPULATED.

4 Dated: April 26, 2019

Respectfully submitted,

5 NICOLA T. HANNA
6 United States Attorney

7 DENNISE D. WILLETT
8 Assistant United States Attorney
9 Chief, Santa Ana Branch Office

10 /s/ 
11 CHARLES E. PELL
12 Assistant United States Attorney
13 Santa Ana Branch Office

Attorneys for Plaintiff
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA


14 I am MARGARET QUICK's attorney. I have carefully discussed
15 every part of this stipulation and the continuance of the trial date
16 with my client. I have fully informed my client of her Speedy Trial
17 rights. To my knowledge, my client understands those rights and
18 agrees to waive them. I believe that my client's decision to give up
19 the right to be brought to trial earlier than November 19, 2019, is
20 an informed and voluntary one.

21 /s/ PER EMAIL AUTHORIZATION
22 EVAN J. DAVIS
23 Attorney for Defendant
24 MARGARET QUICK

05/01/2019
Date

25 I have read this stipulation and have carefully discussed it
26 with my attorney. I understand my Speedy Trial rights. I
27 voluntarily agree to the continuance of the trial date, and give up
28 my right to be brought to trial earlier than November 19, 2019. I
understand that I will be ordered to appear in Courtroom 10D of the

1 Ronald Reagan Federal Courthouse, 411 West 4th Street, Santa Ana,
2 California 92701, on November 19, 2019, at 9:00 a.m.

3 
4 MARGARET QUICK
5 Defendant

4.30.19
Date